We look at the A Preface, especially on the first two paragraphs in which Kant explains that the problematic nature of metaphysics stems from an essential tendency of Reason to leap beyond its own boundaries. I argue that the idea of human finitude plays an important role here. We also briefly discuss the non-psychological nature of Kant's project, something not fulyl appreciated by Bertrand Russell. Required reading: Critique of Pure Reason, Avii-Axxii. Literature mentioned: Bertrand Russell, "The Problems of Philosophy", chapter VIII. Russell writes: "Our nature is as much a fact of the existing world as anything, and there can be no certainty that it will remain constant. It might happen, if Kant is right, that to-morrow our nature would so change as to make two and two become five. This possibility seems never to have occurred to him [...]" It never occurs to Kant because this requires (to look forward to much later passages) that the transcendental ego be in time, which it is precisely not. Strangely, Russell seems to realise that his criticism doesn't really apply to Kant, but then in one quick and mysterious sentence claims that it kind of does anyway. Victor Gijsbers teaches philosophy at Leiden University in the Netherlands. This video is part of his 2021 lecture series "Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason": • Kant's Critique of Pure Reason